This paper proposes a compositional method for verifying the safety of a dynamical system, given as an interconnection of subsystems. The safety verification is conducted by the use of the barrier certificate method; hence, the contribution of this paper is to show how to obtain compositional conditions for safety verification.
INTRODUCTION
Safety verification is an important part of developing a control system. Safety verification ensures that a control system does not violate any state constraints. Numerous methods have been developed for verifying the safety of a * This work was supported by MT-LAB, a VKR Centre of Excellence for the Modeling of Information Technology.
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The safety verification determines if the reachable states of a system intersect a set of unsafe states. Computing the reachable states of a dynamical system is in general very difficult, as seen in [9] ; hence, it may only be possible for systems of low dimension. Therefore, several methods have been developed to approximate the reachable set of a dynamical system. In [4] , the reachable states are approximated based on simulated trajectories, by exploiting that trajectories initialized close to each other stay in the proximity of each other.
Another class of methods, e.g., [1] verifies the safety of a system, by using the vector field to find invariant sets that do not include the unsafe states. Similarly, the papers [13, 12] , provide a method for calculating barrier certificates for safety analysis of continuous, stochastic, and hybrid systems. The idea of these works is to find a barrier function that is decreasing along system trajectories, and has a zero level set (a so called barrier), which no solution trajectory crosses. If the set of initial states is a subset of the zero sublevel set of the barrier function, and the set of unsafe states is in its complement, then the system is safe.
Common to the previously mentioned methods is that they verify the safety of a system, by studying a system directly. However, it may be beneficial to study a system as an interconnection of subsystems, and decompose the verification problem into smaller subproblems. This is suggested for compositional stability analysis in [16] .
In this paper, we show how the barrier certificates in [13, 12] can be generated for a system, given as an interconnection of subsystems. Compositional conditions are given for finding barrier certificates. Additionally, linear matrix inequalities (LMIs) and sum of squares (SOS) are used to generate the barrier certificates, which are solved numerically, by use of SOSTOOLS for MATLAB [14] .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the verification problem in terms of barrier certificates, and Section 3 explains how to reformulate the verification problem by a composition of certificates generated individually for each subsystem. Section 4 shows how to compute the barrier certificates, both via LMIs and polynomial inequalities. Section 5 demonstrates the use of the method, by proving safety of a shutdown procedure for a wind turbine, and Section 6 comprises conclusions.
SAFETY VERIFICATION USING BARRIER CERTIFICATES
In this section, we present the barrier certificate method, which can be used to verify the safety of a dynamical system.
We consider a continuous system given as a system of ordinary differential equationṡ
where x ∈ R n is the state and d ∈ D ⊆ R m is the disturbance input.
For some measurable and essentially bounded disturbance functiond : R ≥0 → D, i.e.,d ∈ L∞(R ≥0 , D), we denote the solution of the Cauchy problem (1) with x(0) = x0 on an interval [0, T ] by φd x 0 , i.e.,
for almost all t ∈ [0, T ]. We consider a system given by Γ = (f, X, X0, Xu, D),
In the safety verification, we only consider trajectories initialized in X0 that are contained in the set X. We verify if there exists a trajectory that can reach an unsafe set Xu.
For a map f : A → B and subset C ⊂ A, we write f (C) ≡ {f (x)| x ∈ C}. Thus, the safety of a system Γ is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Safety
We say that a system Γ is safe if there are no unsafe trajectories.
The safety property can be verified using the following.
Proposition 1 (Strict barrier certificate [13] ).
B(x) > 0 ∀x ∈ Xu, and
Then the system Γ is safe.
Proposition 1 states that a trajectory initialized within the zero sublevel set of a function B, cannot cross the zero level set Z(B), if B is decreasing (along system trajectories) on the zero level set. This is illustrated in Figure 1 .
The set of barrier certificates satisfying Proposition 1 is nonconvex, due to (4c). However, the following more conservative proposition has a convex set of feasible barrier certificates. The convexity property becomes apparent in the computation of the barrier certificates in Section 4. Corollary 1 (Weak barrier certificate [13, 12] ).
Corollary 1 states that a trajectory of a system initialized in a state within the zero sublevel set of a nonincreasing function (along system trajectories), cannot reach the complement of the zero sublevel set. The difference between Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 is that (5c), in contrast to (4c), must hold for all states and all disturbances. Additionally, the inequality constraint (4c) is strict weathers it is weak in (5c).
COMPOSITIONAL BARRIER CERTIFI-CATES
In this section, we assume that a dynamical system is given as an interconnection of subsystems. This allows the safety verification to be split up into smaller subproblems in addition to some coupling constraints.
To provide an overview of the proposed compositional setup, we initially consider an example from [16] , consisting of three interconnected subsystems. The interconnection of the three subsystems is shown in Figure 2 . Properties of the interconnected system are to be analyzed by studying its components as isolated systems, in conjunction with their coupling.
Let each subsystem be described by a system of continuous ordinary differential equations and an output map
where xi ∈ Xi ⊆ R n i is the state, di ∈ Di ⊆ R m i is the disturbance, and ui ∈ R q i is an interconnection input, given by ui = gi(x1, . . . ,xi, . . . , x k ). Here,xi indicates that xi is removed. Additionally, yi ∈ R r i is an interconnection output, given by the map hi :
Note that the interconnection of the subsystems gives a relation between ui and yi. In Figure 2 , y2 = (y The output yi belongs to the set
Similarly, ui belongs to the set
In the remainder of the paper, we present a method for generating barrier certificates for some general topology of the interconnection of subsystems.
Let k ∈ N be the number of subsystems. For i = 1, . . . , k we consider a system Γ = ({fi}, {Xi}, {X0,i}, {Xu,i}, {Di}), where {fi} is a collection of continuous vector fields with fi :
Remark 1. The assumption that the sets X and D are given as cartesian products of Xi and Di in (8) , limits the sets that can be directly expressed; however, by using multiple sets, the original set can, in principle, be approximated. Therefore, the previous restriction does not theoretically restrict the method, but it may complicate the computations involved in the safety verification.
In the following, we present two lemmas that show how to compose the inequality constraints on the barrier function and its derivative in Proposition 1 into separate constraints for the subsystems and coupling constraints. We omit the proofs of both lemmas, as they are straightforward.
In Lemma 1, we let the vector field be given as an interconnection of subsystems, and show that (4c) can be composed into an inequality constraint for each subsystem, and a coupling constraint.
Suppose that there is a bijective map Υ : U → Y . Then there exists a continuous function ϕ :
Lemma 1 can be used to decompose (4c) into an inequality constraint for each subsystem in addition to a coupling constraint.
Using Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we rewrite Proposition 1 as follows.
Proposition 2. Let k ∈ N and let the dynamical system Γ = ({fi}, {Xi}, {X0,i}, {Xu,i}, {Di}) be given. If there exist differentiable functions Bi : Xi → R, constants αi, βi ∈ R, and functions γi :
and for all ui ∈ Ui, xi ∈ Z(Bi)
Proof. We show that Proposition 2 ensures that the conditions in Proposition 1 are satisfied. Let
By Lemma 2, (14a) and (14b) are by the satisfaction of (14d) equivalent to
Finally, by (14c) and (14d)
This is by Lemma 1 equivalent to (4c). Hereby, the system Γ is safe.
The inequality constraints (14a)-(14c) must be satisfied for each subsystem, and (14d) couples the subproblems. Notice that the function B is decreasing along the solution, but each function Bi is not necessarily decreasing along the solution.
In the following, we rewrite Corollary 1 using the same technique.
Corollary 2. Let k ∈ N and let the dynamical system Γ = ({fi}, {Xi}, {X0,i}, {Xu,i}, {Di}) be given. If there exist differentiable functions Bi : Xi → R, constants αi, βi ∈ R, and functions γi :
and for all ui ∈ Ui, xi ∈ Xi
Proposition 2 and Corollary 2 provide compositional conditions for the safety verification. In the next section, we show how to compute the barrier certificates.
COMPUTATION OF BARRIER CERTIFI-CATES
In this section, we show how to compute barrier certificates from the conditions set up in Section 2 and Section 3.
Remark that any desired computational method may be applied to find the barrier certificates, and that different methods can be applied on different subproblems for the compositional conditions in Section 3. This is beneficial if some subsystems are linear and others are polynomial.
To demonstrate the computation of barrier certificates, we show how to compute the barrier certificates using sum of squares programming and linear programming. The primary focus is on sum of squares programming, as it is a generalization of linear programming. Therefore, we only explicitly formulate LMI conditions for the solution of Corollary 2.
To do the computations in a tool such as MATLAB, we restrict the vector fields to be linear (for linear programs) and polynomial (for sum of squares programs). Furthermore, we parameterize the barrier certificates as polynomials, respectively quadratic forms, and require the invariant, initial, unsafe, and disturbance sets to be given by linear and polynomial equality or inequality constraints.
First, we set up some notation about polynomials.
Definition 2 (Polynomial [10]). A polynomial p in n variables x1, . . . , xn is a finite linear combination of monomials
where cα ∈ R and the sum is over a finite number of n-tuples α = [α1, . . . , αn] with αi ≥ 0.
The total degree of a monomial x α is α1 + · · · + αn. Additionally, the total degree of a polynomial is equal to the highest degree of its component monomials. The degree of a polynomial p is denoted by deg(p).
We only consider polynomials with real valued variables, and denote the set of polynomials in n variables by Pn. Recall that a map f : R n → R m is said to be polynomial if its coordinate functions are polynomials, i.e., fi ∈ Pn for i = 1, . . . , m; hence, f ∈ P m n . Sum of squares polynomials are used in the generation of safety certificates and are explained in the following, based on [10] .
for some polynomials pi ∈ Pn with i = 1, . . . , k.
We denote the set of sum of squares polynomials in n variables by Σn.
The set of sum of squares polynomials is a subset of nonnegative polynomials [10] , which can be treated using semidefinite programming, as described below.
The existence of a sum of squares decomposition of a polynomial p ∈ Pn, with d = deg(p), can be expressed as a semidefinite programming feasibility problem. Therefore, the formulation of a problem as sum of squares makes the problem computationally tractable; however, the number of decision variables in the program is
In the search for sum of squares polynomials, it is exploited that the existence of a SOS decomposition of a polynomial p is equivalent to the existence of a positive semidefinite matrix Q = Q T ≥ 0 such that
where Z is a vector of monomials of degree less than or equal to half the degree of p. Let k, l ∈ N, let αi,j ∈ Pn for (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , l}×{1, . . . , k}, and wj ∈ R. An SOS programming problem is
It is seen that an SOS programming problem is a minimization of a linear cost, subject to SOS feasibility constraints.
Computation of Barrier Certificates
To compute barrier certificates using sum of squares programming, we restrict the vector fields to be polynomial. Furthermore, the invariant, initial, unsafe, and disturbance sets must be semialgebraic sets, i.e., be given by polynomial inequalities, as follows.
Let gX : T . Then
where the inequalities in (22) 
It is seen that gX (x) ≥ 0, when x1 ∈ [x1,min, x1,max] and (x2, x3) is in the disk centered at (x2,c, x3,c) with radius r. This implies that the set X given by (22a) and (23) is a cylinder.
In the computation of barrier certificates, we use a generalization of the S-procedure [2] , which is shown in Lemma 3.
Then f (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ V . Now we can compute barrier certificates that satisfy Proposition 1 using sum of squares.
Proposition 3. Let the system Γ = (f, X, X0, Xu, D) and polynomials g * shown in (22) be given, and let
are sum of squares. Then the system Γ is safe.
As Proposition 3 follows directly from Proposition 20 in [13] , no proof is provided. However, all conditions follow directly from Lemma 3. Consider (24a), where B ∈ P n, gX 0 ∈ P
, (24a)∈ Σn, and gX 0 (x) ≥ 0 for any x ∈ X0. Then B(x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ X0.
Note that (24c) contains a scalar product between λB and B, which are both unknown. This is the reason why the conditions in Proposition 3 cannot be found directly by an SOS programming problem, neither by a linear program for quadratic B. Therefore, we generate an iterative algorithm for solving the problem. This algorithm is similar to iterative algorithms used for solving bilinear matrix inequalities via LMIs, see [6] . In the following iterative algorithm, it is necessary to get a feasible solution in each step. Therefore, the barrier certificate is initially found for only a subset of the disturbances D ⊆ D, initial conditionsX0 ⊆ X0, etc., to ease the feasibility. Let cX ∈ R k X ≥0 be a vector of nonnegative numbers. LetgX = gX − cX and definẽ
By decreasing each entry of cX , the setX is enlarged, and if cX = 0 thenX = X. This is illustrated in Figure 3 
Initialization: Choose vectors cX
such that each entry ci, * is sufficiently large and define polynomialsg * ≡ g * −c * . Choose 1, 2 > 0 and specify a polynomial λB ∈ Pn+m, e.g., by choosing λB = 0 or 1.
are sum of squares. 
Fix multiplier: Fix λB obtained in the previous step.
Choose vectors Δc * ≥ 0 and update c * , such that c * := c * − Δc * and redefine the polynomialsg * ≡ g * − c * .
, and λD ∈ Σ If Algorithm 1 terminates, then Γ is safe. Algorithm 1 alternates between freezing the coefficients of λB and B, to remove the product between the two unknown polynomials in (26c). Furthermore, the set of disturbances and the sets for which B should be positive or negative are initially smaller than D, X0 and Xu and are gradually enlarged until they are equal to X0 and Xu. In the enlargement of the sets, it is important that a feasible solution is found in each step of the algorithm. Notice that Algorithm 1 is not guaranteed to terminate or converge to the global optimum; however, this is a general problem with non-convex optimization problems, see e.g. [7] .
Corollary 1 can be solved directly, via the following SOS programming problem.
Corollary 3. Let the system Γ = (f, X, X0, Xu, D) and polynomials g * shown in (22) be given, and let 1 
Computation of Compositional Barrier Certificates
In this subsection, we show how barrier certificates can be expressed in a compositional manner, using SOS optimization for Proposition 2 and Corollary 2, and using LMIs for Corollary 2. The interconnected system can be formulated as one system, but this would increase the number of decision variables involved in the safety verification, compared to the proposed compositional approach. This is an important issue when working with SOS optimization, and is apparent from (19).
Let k ∈ N be the number of subsystems, and define g * ∈ P k * . In the decomposition, the considered sets are restricted, as shown in (8), where
Proposition 2 is written in terms of SOS in the following.
Proposition 4. Let k ∈ N, the polynomials g * shown in (28) and the system Γ = ({fi}, {Xi}, {X0,i}, {Xu,i}, {Di}) be given, and let 1, 2 Proposition 4 has a product between λ
and Bi, which implies that Algorithm 1 must be used to solve it. Additionally, dual decomposition should be used to decompose the conditions; however, this is only demonstrated for the following SOS program for solving Corollary 2.
Corollary 4. Let k ∈ N, the polynomials g * shown in (28) and the system Γ = ({fi}, {Xi}, {X0,i}, {Xu,i}, {Di}) be given, and let 1 are sum of squares. Then the system Γ is safe.
In the following, we show how to prove safety using LMIs based on Corollary 2. The vector field fi is given bẏ
where Ai is an ni × ni matrix, B1,i is an ni × mi matrix, B2,i is an ni × mi matrix, and Ci is an qi × ni matrix. We say that Bi(xi) = x
where Pi and G * are symmetric matrices, and αi, βi ∈ R. Furthermore, we define γi as
where Γu,i and Γx,i are diagonal matrices.
Corollary 5. Let k ∈ N, the polynomials g * shown in (28) and the system Γ = ({fi}, {Xi}, {X0,i}, {Xu,i}, {Di}) be given, where {fi} is a collection of linear vector fields, and G * is symmetric. If there exist Pi = P T i , αi, βi ∈ R, and matrices Γu,i, Γx,i given in (32), λX 0,i ∈ R ≥0 , λX i ∈ R ≥0 , λD i ∈ R ≥0 , and λU i ∈ R ≥0 such that
To practically solve the safety problem in Corollary 4, we set up an optimization problem by use of dual decomposition [3] . Dual decomposition can be used to solve different types of optimization problems. We consider only the following type of optimization problem. minimize f (x) = f1(x1, y) + f2(x2, y) subject to x1 ∈ C1, x2 ∈ C2, h1(x1, y) + h2(x2, y) ≤ 0.
We decompose (34) into two separate optimization problems, which are coupled through some additional decision variables as follows
The dual problem can be set up, as f1 and f2 have no shared variables. The Lagrangian for the problem is
Let λ = (λ1, λ2). The dual function becomes
where ϕ1(λ) = inf
The optimization problems for ϕ1 and ϕ2 can be solved independently, given values for λ1 and λ2. Finally, the master problem is
with variables λ1 and λ2.
To solve the master problem, we utilize the subgradient algorithm given in [15] . Note that all functions in this paper are polynomial, thus differentiable; hence, other gradient methods can be used instead of the subgradient method.
Let f : R n → R be a convex function, and let x, y ∈ R n . Then any vector g ∈ R n that satisfies
is called a subgradient at x. Let f : R n → R be a convex function. Then the subgradient algorithm gives a sequence of points {x
according to
where
is a subgradient of f at x (k) , and Δ k is the step size. When the function f to be minimized is differentiable, then g (k) is the unique gradient of f at point x (k) . For diminishing step size, the algorithm is guaranteed to converge to the optimal value, see [11] . Therefore, we use the following diminishing step size
where a > 0 and b ≥ 0.
The following algorithm is used to solve the dual decomposition for the problem shown in (34). Note that we denote byx
the optimal values of x1 and y1 for problem (37a) at iteration k, given some λ1, λ2. 
Aerodynamics

It is seen that if
as the first element of g(λ (k) ) is negative. This puts a larger penalty on the violation of the constraint through the dual variable λ1.
EXAMPLE
In this section, we demonstrate the applicability of the compositional safety analysis, by analyzing the safety of an emergency shutdown of a wind turbine. The emergency shutdown procedure is simplified for presentation, and the wind turbine model is a slight modification of the CART3 wind turbine model [8] .
The wind turbine is modeled as an interconnection of three subsystems: aerodynamics (subsystem 1), tower (subsystem 2), and drive train (subsystem 3). A block diagram of the wind turbine is shown in Figure 4 .
The wind turbine is driven by an exogenous input -the wind vw. Via the aerodynamics, the wind exerts a torque Tr on the rotor shaft, and a force Ft on the top of the tower. This bends the tower and makes the rotor shaft rotate. The rotor shaft is connected to a generator through a gear and a generator shaft. A converter applies a torque Tg to the generator shaft.
The magnitude of the torque Tr and the force Ft depends on the pitch angle β, the rotor speed ωr, and the wind speed at the rotor vw − vt, given by the speed of the wind vw and the velocity of the tower vt. These relations are usually described by lookup tables (Cp and Ct tables); however, we approximate them by polynomials.
In case of severe faults, a wind turbine is shut down by pitching the blades to an angle of β = 90
• , while applying a constant generator torque Tg = 3, 580 Nm, until the rotor speed is below a threshold of 0.77 rad/s, from which it is not possible to apply a torque from the generator; hence, the wind turbine is left uncontrolled. At a pitch angle of 90
• , the aerodynamic thrust is acting in the opposite direction of the nominal rotation; hence, it decelerates. Additionally, by applying a relatively high generator torque, the rotor shaft is decelerated even faster. This may cause the tower to sway too much or twist the rotor shaft beyond the limit accepted by the turbine structure. Therefore, we verify that this does not happen. The subsystems of the wind turbine are modeled as shown in (49), and will be left without further explanation. 
Now the verification problem has been set up, and we do the verification using Corollary 4. To allow the verification, we need to characterize Xi, X0,i , Xu,i, and Ui by polynomials. This is accomplished as by specifying a maximum value xmax and minimum value xmin of some variable x, and then defining
The polynomial g is nonnegative for x ∈ [xmin, xmax] and otherwise negative.
To give an impression of the convergence of the algorithm, the values of the multipliers λ1, . . . , λ6 are shown in Figure 5 
CONCLUSION
We have presented a method for verifying the safety of an interconnection of subsystems. The method is based on the identification of barrier certificates, where the certificates are found for each subsystem, but are coupled through some additional constraints.
The presented method allows the safety verification of higher dimensional systems, as the verification is decomposed into smaller coupled subproblems, and allows subsystems to be analyzed with different computational methods.
The method has been used to verify the safety of an emergency shutdown procedure for a wind turbine.
